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Comments from the board: 
- Answer one: Could Julia both explain and demonstrate further how neoliberalism is 
implicated in new narratives of modern slavery. The opening answer would also benefit from 
concrete examples, which would help preface what follows. 
- Overall: Would benefit from being shortened since the piece is rather long for a blog. An 
overall edit for clarity of argument would also help - making the arguments more 
straightforward.  
 
In her latest book ‘Modern Slavery: the Margins of Freedom’, Julia O’Connell-Davidson 
provides a historically and theoretically-engaged critical analysis of what the New Abolitionists 
have been calling ‘modern slavery’. According to New Abolitionists, there are currently 35 
million people living as ‘modern slaves’. However, for O’Connell-Davidson, such number is a 
result of using ‘modern slavery’ in discussions on anything, without providing a precise 
definition of the term. ‘Modern slavery’ would appear in a series of stock phrases in 
discussions on prostitution, child labour, “illegal” immigration, female circumcision, begging 
and organ-trading. By discussing what is described as ‘forced labour’, ‘debt-bondage’, ‘forced 
marriage’, ‘trafficking’ and ‘sex trafficking’, O’Connell-Davidson challenges how these 
numbers are produced and the ways in which the term ‘modern slavery’ is employed in the 
fight against ‘slavery’. Her argument is not that the world is free of oppression, exploitation 
and suffering, but rather, that New Abolitionism offers a selective lens through which to view 
restraints on human freedom. Such a ‘selective lens’ would address ‘situations of modern 
slavery’ in isolation from the political and economic structures and inequalities in which they 
are embedded - since it tends to place the problem into the individuals hands and/or to their 
‘traditional cultures’. Moreover, O’Connell-Davidson also questions the politics of naming 
some current exploitative situations as ‘modern slavery’ and others not, highlighting many 
existing controversies on the ways in which the term ‘modern slavery’ has been used. 
Even though such arguments are discussed in depth throughout the book, ‘Modern Slavery: 
the Margins of Freedom’ has been met with some provocative arguments on various media 
platforms, such as BBC Radio 4 Thinking Allowed and Open democracy. In the latter, for 
instance, it has been argued that O’Connell-Davidson suggests the idea of ‘modern slavery’ is 
‘inane and clichéd’, thus her argument is said to ‘undermine anti-slavery activism and deny an 
appalling reality for thousands who are trafficked, sold and enslaved’ (Gupta, 2016). 
In this interview, with Angelo Martins Jr, O’Connell-Davidson discusses and outlines the main 
points of her book, and elaborates upon some of its most controversial arguments.  
 
Angelo Martins Jr: Can we start by discussing how and why you came to undertake this 
project? 
Julia O’Connell Davidson: I was involved in research on ‘human trafficking’ from 2001, and 
as the years went on, I noticed how ‘anti-trafficking’ talk increasingly employed the language 
of slavery and abolition. In fact, popular and political interest in ‘trafficking’ seemed to be 
helping fuel (and fund) a renewal of the anti-slavery movement, which in turn helped to keep 
‘trafficking’ high on the media and political agenda. A whole series of new anti-slavery NGOs 
sprang up in the US, Australia and Western European countries between 2000 and 2012, 
including Free the Slaves; Stop the Traffik; Not For Sale; End Slavery Now; CNN Freedom 
Project; Alliance Against Modern Slavery; and Walk Free Foundation. These organisations 
(which I call ‘new abolitionist’) have been remarkably successful in popularising their vision of 
‘modern slavery’ as a global social problem, so successful that as well as attracting a great 
deal of popular support, you also now find Western political and business leaders endorsing 
their project and mouthing their catchphrases. Now that might look like rather cheering news 
– surely it’s good to know that the world’s powerful elites want to eradicate slavery? But in a 
world where slavery is everywhere already outlawed, so that nobody, anywhere, is legally 
ascribed the status of ‘slave’, what exactly are these powerful actors promising to combat? 
What does the term ‘modern slavery’ mean? If you look more closely at how politicians use 
the term, their vow to eliminate it doesn’t look quite so heartening. In fact, it’s mostly 
employed to legitimate new mechanisms of domination and discipline, as opposed to helping 
eradicate mechanisms of subordination, segregation, inequality and oppression.  
So a key motivation for writing this book was to challenge the assumptions and claims about 
‘modern slavery’ that have been so widely circulated as to become almost taken-for-granted 
by many journalists and activists as well as many politicians. But as you say, I wasn’t trying to 
deconstruct the new abolitionist message because I believe that everything in the world is 
hunky dory. Quite the reverse. Nor did I want to say, “Forget slavery, that’s over and we’ve 
nothing to learn by thinking about it”. Again, quite the opposite. There’s a really rich, nuanced 
and interdisciplinary body of scholarship on slavery historically which, though ignored by the 
new abolitionists, I think speaks incredibly powerfully to questions about domination and 
unfreedom in the contemporary world. So the other starting point for the project was to ask 
what we could potentially learn about contemporary social and political life by thinking more 
seriously about transatlantic slavery and its living legacies. Crucially, if we look behind the 
celebratory tale in which the rise of modern liberal society is a story of ever-growing freedom 
for everyone, and think seriously about the fact that transatlantic slavery emerged and 
flourished alongside the development of modern, liberal societies (which is to say if we 
recognize that transatlantic slavery was modern slavery), it opens up important questions 
about when and why profoundly illiberal practices and relations can be tolerated in modern 
liberal societies. 
AMJ: By highlighting the complex relationship between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ in the several 
themes discussed throughout the book, you confront the New Abolitionists’ assertion that it is 
possible to lose or be robbed of ‘free will’ and agency, and that slavery is defined by its 
reduction of persons to things. Actually, through the whole book you try to break with a set of 
dichotomies - such as person/thing, object/subject -, which are present in both classical liberal 
theories as well as in the New Abolitionists’ discourses. Can you further discuss this complex 
relationship and theories that have helped you to make sense of this? 
JOD: There’s a wealth of theory (Marxist, feminist, critical race and postcolonial) that helps us 
think critically about the liberal tendency to imagine the social and political order in terms of a 
series of oppositional binaries (e.g., subject/object, mind/body, freedom/slavery, 
modern/traditional, political/economic, public/private, persons/things). The difficulty is always 
how to marshal their insights simultaneously, as opposed to imposing a theoretical ‘division of 
labour’ along lines of: Marxist theory to reveal the fictional nature of the liberal separation 
between political and economic life; feminist theory to challenge the separation between 
public (political and economic) and private (domestic) life and the mind/body dualism; 
postcolonial theory to deconstruct traditional/modern, past/present binaries, and so on. As 
well as drawing inspiration from theorists who try to tackle this problem (the work of Angela 
Davis, 1981, Nirmal Puwar, 2004, Laura Brace, 2004, Gurminder Bhambra, 2007, Kathi 
Weeks, 2011, to name a few), I find recent critical scholarship on transatlantic slavery, along 
with the writings of freed and fugitive slaves, incredibly illuminating in this regard.  
One thing this literature makes you realise is that although the singular horror of slavery is 
widely considered to be its reduction of human beings to property (it converts ‘persons into 
things’ as one of the founders of the American Anti-Slavery Society put it), transatlantic 
slavery actually implied something still more terrible. The enslaved were given, in Saidiya 
Hartman’s (1997) words, a ‘bifurcated existence’ or ‘double character’ as both things and 
persons. Yes, they were bought, sold, mortgaged, bequeathed, and gifted as property. But 
they were also acknowledged ‘as moral, intellectual and responsible beings’ in laws that 
deemed them criminally culpable human agents (Douglass, 2003: 275). Unlike the livestock 
to which they were routinely compared, they were arrested, tried, and barbarically and 
spectacularly punished when they transgressed the laws that criminalised their independent 
mobility, voice, and any effort to resist or defend themselves against the power of their 
masters and white people more generally.  
Those laws were necessary in transatlantic slave societies precisely because you cannot 
literally turn a human being into a ‘thing’ or puppet-like object simply by constructing them as 
an object of property in law. The enslaved still retained agency in the sense that, except when 
physically held in chains or beaten to unconsciousness, they had to choose their course of 
action, to decide whether or not to resist commands, or to run away when the opportunity 
presented itself, and so on. The brutal body of law that constructed slaves as criminally 
responsible persons was designed to try to make compliance the most likely choice. So 
without the state’s intervention to create slaves as persons (of a particular, inferior, and 
rightless kind), slaveholders’ property rights in them as things would have been empty. They 
could have fought back or run away. Here you have a very clear example of the fact that 
political life (state, law, civil society, the realm in which human beings are constituted as 
‘persons’) is integrally bound to private economic life (the market realm in which persons act 
to produce and exchange commodities or ‘things’), and vice-versa.  
But slavery also cut across the public/private dichotomy that preoccupies feminist theorists, 
because whilst constructed as market-alienable property, transatlantic slaves were 
incorporated into the slaveholder’s household as dependents, along with women, children, 
servants, and apprentices. And yet slaves very obviously occupied a different position in the 
social order to that of white wives, children and servants, which alerts you to the fact that race 
was absolutely central to the particular ways in which the enslaved were incorporated into 
both the private domestic and the private economic realm. In fact, the history of transatlantic 
slavery helps explain why race is so fundamental to the liberal social order, right down to the 
very terms and categories that are used to make sense of it. Because as Charles Mills (2008: 
1394) puts it, ‘the same developments of modernity that brought liberalism into existence as a 
supposedly general set of political norms also brought race into existence as a set of 
restrictions and entitlements governing the application of those norms’. 
All of this is hugely relevant for structure/agency debates in relation both to the history of the 
enslaved, and to forms of oppression and exploitation in the contemporary moment. It allows 
you to work with Marx’s basic insight that people make history, but not in circumstances of 
their own choosing, but ‘thicken’ it by recognising the multiplicity and complexity of the 
circumstances that constrain our choices. Think, for example, about the fact that the enslaved 
did forge affective ties to one another, even if those connections were not legally recognised 
or respected. Those ties to kin and community (which can get presented as astonishing 
evidence of slave ‘agency’ by those who imagine that human beings are literally 
dehumanized when legally constructed as subpersons) were often part of what had to be 
weighed up in decisions about compliance or resistance or escape. Could you choose to take 
advantage of an opportunity to flee if that meant leaving your children in the prison of slavery, 
for example?  
The painful realities of being forced to make such decisions are documented in a number of 
slave narratives, and very powerfully elucidated by Edlie Wong (2009) in her book, Neither 
Fugitive Nor Free. In fact, Wong’s work draws attention to the ways in which agency is 
constrained by affective, as well as economic and political structures, and really makes you 
see how even in the context of slavery, gender differentially constrained the possibilities for 
action open to individuals. It very brilliantly highlights the ambiguities of ‘choice’ and 
‘freedom’. And closer attention to these ambiguities makes it possible to recognise slavery’s 
immense structural weight but also acknowledge and respect the political subjectivity of the 
enslaved, including its expression in what Stephanie Camp (2004) called the ‘hidden culture 
of opposition’ and ‘rival geographies’ created by bondwomen and children as well as men. 
These and other lessons about the complexity of the relationship between structure and 
agency can then be applied to contemporary contexts that are dubbed ‘modern slavery’ by 
the new abolitionists, which is basically what I’ve tried to do in the book.   
AMJ: As you mention in your book, there are many anti-slavery movements nowadays, with 
an impressive broad appeal coming from the Western affluent world and from the privileged 
elites of the developing countries. Poverty actions in ‘the non-modern/developing world’, for 
instance, have become a key part of how ‘the super-rich’ creates a sense of global 
citizenship, since ‘freeing slaves is joyous, cheap and ‘we’ can all be heroes’. However, this is 
based on the assumption that some groups and societies have still not yet fully joined ‘the 
modern world’. In this sense, would you claim that ‘their’ fight against ‘modern slavery’ is 
based on a (‘racial’) neoliberal discourse that instead of putting and end to ‘slavery’, it actually 
helps to reproduce hierarchical relationships and socio-economic inequalities in the globe? 
JOD: Well, maybe to legitimate rather than actively reproduce, but yes. However, I would 
want to qualify that by drawing a distinction between the new brand of NGOs, like Free the 
Slaves and Walk Free, whose raison d’etre is to lead a popular movement against ‘modern 
slavery’, and the NGOs and activists involved in struggles to support particular groups of 
workers who sometimes use the language of ‘modern slavery’ and ‘trafficking’ to try to 
emphasise the injustice and oppression they face. The latter don’t necessarily form part of 
what Teju Cole calls ‘the white saviour industrial complex’ (though some may), but the former 
certainly do. In fact, they often very explicitly continue a colonial transition narrative, in which 
‘debt slavery’, ‘bonded labour’ and ‘WFCL’ in the Indian sub-continent and in African countries 
are examples of people helplessly trapped by their ‘traditional’ cultures, and the solution is for 
white Westerners to help them on the road to economic development and modernization. But 
though the new abolitionists represent these forms of ‘slavery’ as vestiges of a benighted 
past, most serious analysis of the settings in which forced and bonded labour and WFCL are 
found suggests that they are very much an outcome of the contemporary twinning of 
neoliberal structural adjustment policies with export-oriented industrialization strategies in 
developing countries. This is a policy combination that has encouraged the expansion of an 
informal, non-unionised and unprotected economic sector, and that has intensified processes 
of land dispossession leading to increased internal, often seasonal, migration as well as 
international migration. So when we look at these groups of workers, we’re seeing one of 
contemporary neoliberal capitalism’s many faces, not the age-old visage of some traditional, 
slavery-like practice. And to the extent that the new abolitionism deflects attention from that 
fact, I see it as very much part of the problem, not the solution. 
And there are other senses in which the new abolitionism works to reproduce what I’d 
describe as very dodgy race politics. Because while on the one hand it presents transatlantic 
slavery as the historical comparator for contemporary forms of oppression and violence that 
in fact bear little or no resemblance to it, on the other hand, the discourse of ‘modern slavery’ 
denies, conceals or ignores contemporary forms of injustice, exclusion, abuse and violence 
that are in fact direct products of transatlantic slavery. As a number of critical race scholars 
have argued, the ‘afterlife’ of transatlantic slavery is a present in which black lives continue to 
be devalued and imperilled, and whiteness continues to be valued and privileged. But the 
restraints on freedom engendered by anti-blackness are entirely absent from new abolitionist 
talk of ‘modern slavery’. The millions of black victims of America’s prison industrial complex, 
for example, are not present in the roll call of ‘modern slaves’ that organizations like Walk 
Free and Free the Slaves wish to emancipate.  
AMJ: Within this neoliberal logic that ‘buries alive’ (Goldberg and Giroux, 2014) social, 
political and economic structures (by placing the problem into the individuals hands and to 
their ‘traditional cultures’), I would like to ask you to further develop the relationship between 
‘modern slavery’ and the State. How does the discourse on ‘modern slavery’ play an 
important role in justifying the extremely violent State actions on ‘bordering and controlling’, 
which has been resulting in thousands of deaths and immigration detentions in ‘liberal 
democratic states’? 
JOD: From the late 1990s, the concept of ‘trafficking’ has been worked by politicians in 
Europe, Australia and North America to frame their efforts to ‘crack down on illegal 
immigration’ as part of a noble struggle to protect human rights, as opposed to violating the 
right to freedom of movement and compromising the right to life itself. They continue to move 
from expressing horror about the supposed resurgence of a ‘modern slave trade’ in the form 
of ‘human trafficking’ to defending the state’s use of ever more draconian measures to 
constrict and control human mobility. This includes the growing use of (often for profit) 
immigration detention and deportation, even deportation of unaccompanied child migrants, 
said to be necessary in order to ‘send a message’ to ‘traffickers’. Of course it’s true that many 
people’s journeys to affluent and politically stable regions are horrific – long marches on foot 
across hostile terrain with inadequate protection against the elements, extraordinary perilous 
sea crossings in overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels, and the death toll on such journeys is 
appalling. It’s also true that some (not all) of those who facilitate such movement do so for 
private profit, and amongst them, there are some unscrupulous, highly exploitative 
individuals. And it’s true that very violent criminals sometimes prey on irregular migrants, 
kidnapping them and holding them to ransom, even torturing and murdering them. But even 
given all these facts, the frequently drawn parallel between the transatlantic slave trade and 
irregular migration today is frankly ludicrous.  
The African victims of the transatlantic slave trade did not want to move to the New World, it 
required overwhelming force to transport them there. The people described as victims of a 
‘modern-day slave trade’ urgently wish to migrate, invariably for compelling reasons. The 
transatlantic slave trade was legally sanctioned by states, insured and financed by legitimate 
companies, and fully integrated into the formal economy of slave trading nations. It made 
entire cities as well as private individuals wealthy. What is today described as a ‘modern-day 
slave trade’ involves small scale, informal and criminalised activities. The transatlantic slave 
trade ripped its victims from their families. Many people described as victims of a ‘modern day 
slave trade’ are either travelling with their families, or attempting to join kin already abroad. 
And finally, where the transatlantic slave trade inevitably and invariably led to one appalling 
outcome – chattel slavery – the so called ‘modern day slave trade’ often serves to transport 
people into conditions that are safer and/or otherwise more desirable than the conditions they 
left. Hence people are willing to take the enormous risks associated with unauthorised 
migration. 
And the fact is that all of the death and misery associated with unsanctioned migration today 
is very simply and easily avoidable. It’s much cheaper to buy plane tickets from Morocco to 
Germany, or from Turkey to the UK, than it is to secure the services of smugglers to take you 
and your children across the Mediterranean or the Aegean in an overcrowded dinghy, for 
example. The only reason people take the infinitely more dangerous route is that EU 
immigration law prevents them from boarding the safe budget airline plane that EU citizens 
are at liberty to board. If we are looking for a parallel between what is happening today and 
the history of transatlantic slavery, then instead of looking at the forced movement of Africans 
into chattel slavery, we would do better to look at transatlantic slaves’ efforts to flee slavery, 
and the techniques employed by slave states to prevent this. Here the similarities between 
past and present are marked. In fact, virtually all the techniques that are used by 
contemporary states to control and prevent the unwanted movement of particular populations 
(from passports, patrols, fences, walls, and checkpoints through to carrier sanctions) were 
trailed by slave states seeking to control the mobility of slaves. 
From the perspective of anti-immigration politicians, the beauty of ‘trafficking’ and ‘modern 
slavery’ discourse is precisely that it allows them to bury the violence, and violent 
consequences, of immigration controls in a narrative about individual immorality and 
criminality. Again, I see the people at the forefront of the new abolitionist movement as 
complicit with this, even if sometimes only unwittingly, just as their failure to condemn the 
American prison industrial complex makes them complicit with the racist logic of black 
criminality that’s used to ‘make sense of’ the massive and disproportionate rate of 
incarceration of black and Hispanic people (Muhammad, 2010). 
AMJ: Would you say that the ways in which the media, politicians, academics and NGOs 
have been portraying ‘the refugee crisis’, in Europe, works in an analogous way to the 
discourse of ‘modern slavery’ and its functionality for State actions? Would the current fight 
on ‘the refugee crisis’ also be a ‘double-speak that is seen as part of a fight to secure 
fundamental human rights, as opposed to implying a violation of those rights’? 
JOD: Absolutely in the case of mainstream academics and NGOs, and right wing and social 
democratic media and politicians. Part of the discourse of ‘modern slavery’ is that Western 
liberal societies, which are supposedly defined by their love of human rights and freedom, are 
under threat from the pre-modern barbarians who would ‘traffic’ slavery onto their soil. That 
same preoccupation with ‘our’ vulnerability is there in talk of how Europe is in danger of being 
‘overwhelmed’ by refugees and economic migrants. It’s a paranoid tale about how liberal 
societies have undercut their very basis by being too liberal, allowing too much diversity, too 
much immigration, being too respectful of the rights of people who aren’t actually qualified to 
exercise rights and freedoms. And yet in fact, even leaving aside the fact that the current 
situation is largely a product of the foreign, immigration and economic policies pursued by 
Western liberal states over the past two decades, there is no ‘refugee crisis’ for Europe. 
Though a crisis for the individuals trapped at borders, the EU with its wealth and advanced 
economy could readily accommodate the numbers of people attempting to enter via the 
Mediterranean and the Balkans - the crisis is not that ‘Europe is full, yet people keep coming’, 
but rather a crisis of European politics (Roth, 2015). Or more to the point, it is a crisis of 
liberalism. Images of drowned three year olds washing up on EU beaches, of parents 
struggling to care for new born babies in filthy, freezing, insanitary encampments in EU 
countries, of people on hunger strike at EU borders, lips sewn together, torsos emblazoned 
with the words “Save me or shoot me!”, all work to graphically reveal the immense and violent 
illiberality of which liberal states are capable. But the only way to prevent these and other 
horrifying scenes would be to tear down the borders and de-territorialize rights that are now 
linked to citizenship and residency. And that would mean liberal states having to surrender 
certain powers that are currently framed as integral to sovereignty, but that in fact lead to 
gross violations of what would in other contexts be understood as basic and universal human 
rights.  
Both the discourse of the ‘refugee crisis’ and that of ‘modern slavery’ help to divert us from 
that conclusion, and so work to inhibit democratic debate about what surrendering those 
powers would actually mean. Would the economic and social fabric really collapse if every 
human being secured the right to freely enter as well as freely exit any territory, and if every 
human being standing on any given territory enjoyed full and equal rights with others on the 
same territory? Again, the history of transatlantic slavery might have something to teach us, 
because in the anxieties today expressed about immigration, there are strong echoes of 
nineteenth century concerns about the threat that the abolition of slavery would pose to the 
liberal social order. Even those who in principle opposed chattel slavery often feared that its 
abolition would have dire economic consequences (falling wages, the collapse of industries 
and even entire European economies), and many white people, including Great White 
Abolitionists like Wilberforce and Lincoln, believed that people of colour were culturally or 
biologically unready for the exercise of freedom and could never be assimilated as equal 
citizens of free white nations (hence Lincoln ideally favoured a policy of deporting 
emancipated slaves to Haiti, Panama, or Liberia). Certainly, the history of abolition doesn’t 
provide a very hopeful model in the sense that it ultimately proved perfectly possible to 
sustain a system of racial domination in the absence of chattel slavery. But it does at least 
show us that change is possible. Even social structures and institutions that appear to the 
vast majority of the population as utterly inevitable and entirely unalterable – as slavery once 
did and borders now do - can be transformed. But to ensure such transformations translate 
into freedom always requires on-going, collective political struggle.  
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